Updated on 2026/03/07

写真a

 
INOUE TOMOKI
 
Organization
Undergraduate School School of Political Science and Economics Senior Assistant Professor
Title
Senior Assistant Professor
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Degree

  • Ph.D. in Economics ( 2005.4   Keio University )

  • M.A. in Economics ( 2000.3   Keio University )

  • B.A. in Economics ( 1998.3   Keio University )

Research Interests

  • Core

  • Indivisible commodities

  • Walrasian equilibrium

Research Areas

  • Humanities & social sciences / Theoretical economics  / 協力ゲーム理論(Cooperative Game Theory)

  • Humanities & social sciences / Theoretical economics  / 数理経済学(Mathematical Economics)

  • Humanities & social sciences / Theoretical economics  / 一般均衡理論(General Equilibrium Theory)

Education

  • Keio University   Graduate School, Division of Economics

    2000.4 - 2005.3

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    Country/Region: Japan

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  • Keio University   Graduate School, Division of Economics

    1998.4 - 2000.3

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    Country/Region: Japan

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  • Keio University   Faculty of Economics

    1994.4 - 1998.3

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    Country/Region: Japan

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Research History

  • Meiji University   School of Political Science and Economics   Assistant Professor

    2013.4

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  • Tokyo Metropolitan University   School of Business Administration, Faculty of Urban Liberal Arts, Tokyo   Assistant Professor   Assitant Professor

    2011.4 - 2013.3

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  • Bielefeld University, Germany   Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)   Post-Doctoral Fellow

    2008.4 - 2011.3

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  • University of Oxford, UK   Department of Economics   Researher Postdoc   Visiting Scholar

    2007.10 - 2008.3

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  • Universiteit Maastricht, The Netherlands   Department of Economics   Researher Postdoc   Visiting Scholar

    2006.9 - 2007.8

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  • JSPS   Special researcher of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science   Research Fellow

    2006.4 - 2008.3

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  • 慶應義塾大学大学院   経済学研究科   研究生

    2005.4 - 2006.3

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  • Keio University   The 21st Century Center of Excellence Program, Faculty of Economics and Faculty of Business and Commerce   Researher Postdoc   Research Assistant

    2003.11 - 2005.3

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  • Keio University   Faculty of Economics   Research Assistant   Research Associate

    2001.4 - 2002.3

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Professional Memberships

  • The Japanese Society for Mathematical Economics

    2019.4

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  • Japanese Economic Association

    2016.4

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Committee Memberships

  • The Japanese Society for Mathematical Economics   Director of General Affairs, Vice President  

    2025.4   

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    Committee type:Academic society

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  • The Japanese Society for Mathematical Economics   Council Member  

    2023.4   

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    Committee type:Academic society

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  • The Japanese Society for Mathematical Economics   Director for the Society's journal  

    2023.4 - 2025.3   

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    Committee type:Academic society

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Papers

  • Coincidence theorem and the inner core Reviewed

    Pure and Applied Functional Analysis   6 ( 4 )   761 - 775   2021

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:Yokohama Publishers  

    We provide two coincidence theorems that are useful mathematical tools for proving the nonemptiness of the inner core. The inner core is a refinement of the core of non-transferable utility (NTU) games. Our first coincidence theorem is a synthesis of Brouwer's fixed point theorem and Debreu and Schmeidler's separation theorem for convex sets. Our second coincidence theorem is a modification of the first one in order for two correspondences to have a nonempty intersection at a strictly positive vector. Inoue's theorem on the nonemptiness of the inner core follows from our first coincidence theorem and an assumption on the efficient surface of payoff vectors for the grand coalition. Our coincidence theorems are suitable for proving the nonemptiness of the inner core in the sense that one of the assumptions in our first coincidence theorem is equivalence to the cardinal balancedness of an NTU game when two correspondences are defined properly.

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  • The nonemptiness of the inner core Reviewed

    Advances in Mathematical Economics   23   85 - 107   2020.2

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)   Publisher:Springer  

    We prove that if a non-transferable utility (NTU) game is cardinally balanced and if, at every individually rational and efficient payoff vector, every non-zero normal vector to the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is strictly positive, then the inner core is nonempty. The condition on normal vectors is satisfied if the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is non-leveled. An NTU game generated by an exchange economy where every consumer has a continuous, concave, and strongly monotone utility function satisfies our sufficient condition. Our proof relies on Qin's theorem on the nonemptiness of the inner core.

    DOI: 10.1007/978-981-15-0713-7_3

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  • Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core Reviewed

    Journal of Mathematical Economics   54   22 - 35   2014.10

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)  

    We consider a pure exchange economy with finitely many indivisible commodities that are available only in integer quantities. We prove that in such an economy with a sufficiently large number of agents, but finitely many agents, the strong core coincides with the set of expenditure-minimizing Walrasian allocations. Because of the indivisibility, the preference maximization does not imply the expenditure minimization. An expenditure-minimizing Walrasian equilibrium is a state where, under some price vector, all agents satisfy both the preference maximization and the expenditure minimization.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.07.002

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  • Representation of non-transferable utility games by coalition production economies Reviewed

    Journal of Mathematical Economics   49 ( 2 )   141-149   2013.3

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)  

    We prove that every compactly generated non-transferable utility (NTU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. The set of Walrasian payoff vectors for our induced coalition production economy coincides with the inner core of the balanced cover of the original game. This equivalence depends heavily on our representation. We exemplify that this equivalence need not hold in other representations. We also give a sufficient condition for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for our induced coalition production economy.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.12.001

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  • Representation of transferable utility games by coalition production economies Reviewed

    Journal of Mathematical Economics   48 ( 3 )   143-147   2012.5

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)  

    We prove that, by the method of construction of a coalition production economy due to Sun et al. [Sun, N., Trockel, W., Yang, Z., 2008. Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game. Journal of Mathematical Economics 44, 853-860], every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coalition production economy. Namely, for every TU game, we can construct a coalition production economy that generates the given game. We briefly discuss the relationship between the core of a given TU game and the set of Walrasian payoff vectors for the induced coalition production economy.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.02.004

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  • A utility representation theorem with weaker continuity condition Reviewed

    Journal of Mathematical Economics   46 ( 1 )   122-127   2010.1

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)  

    We prove that a mixture continuous preference relation has a utility representation if its domain is a convex subset of a finite dimensional vector space. Our condition on the domain of a preference relation is stronger than Eilenberg (1941) and Debreu (1959, 1964), but our condition on the continuity of a preference relation is strictly weaker than the usual continuity assumed by them.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.09.002

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  • Indivisible commodities and the nonemptiness of the weak core Reviewed

    Journal of Mathematical Economics   44 ( 2 )   96-111   2008.1

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)  

    We consider a sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the weak core in a finite exchange economy where every commodity is available only in integer quantities. We show that if the aggregate upper contour set is discretely convex, then the weak core is nonempty. In addition, we give two sufficient conditions for the aggregate upper contour set to be discretely convex. One is that every upper contour set of every agent is M-natural-convex. The other is that the number of commodities is two and every agent's preference relation is weakly monotone and discretely convex.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.07.009

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  • Do pure indivisibilities prevent core equivalence? Core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with purely indivisible commodities only Reviewed

    Journal of Mathematical Economics   41 ( 4-5 )   571-601   2005.8

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    Language:English   Publishing type:Research paper (scientific journal)  

    We consider a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents and finitely many indivisible commodities. Every commodity can be consumed only in integer amounts. Thus, agents' preferences are locally satiated and no commodity bundle has necessarily local cheaper points. We introduce a core which is an intermediate concept between the strong core and the weak core. In our economy, this core is the most natural concept in the sense that it coincides with the set of all exactly feasible Walras allocations.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.09.004

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Books

  • ミクロ経済学演習第2版

    猪野弘明,井上朋紀,加藤晋,川森智彦,矢野智彦,山口和男( Role: Joint author)

    東京大学出版会  2018.9 

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    Language:Japanese   Book type:Scholarly book

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Presentations

  • Uniqueness of Walrasian equilibrium in Edgeworth box economies with CES preferences

    Annual Meeting on Mathematical Economics and Related Fields  2025.11 

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    Language:Japanese   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

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  • Zermelo's theorem and an alternating-move location game

    Game Theory Workshop  2024.3 

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    Language:Japanese   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

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  • Zermelo's theorem and an alternating-move location game

    Annual Meeting on Mathematical Economics and Related Fields  2023.11 

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    Language:Japanese   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

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  • Zermelo's theorem and an alternating-move location game

    29th Decentralization Conference  2023.9 

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    Language:Japanese   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

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  • A core equivalence theorem for a private ownership atomless economy

    28th Decentralization Conference  2022.10 

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    Language:Japanese   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

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  • A core equivalence theorem for a private ownership atomless economy

    21st SAET Conference  2022.7 

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    Language:English   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

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  • Equivalence theorem on cores of a private ownership atomless economy

    Annual Meeting on Mathematical Economics and Related Fields  2020.11 

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    Language:Japanese   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

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  • Core convergence theorems for economies with bads

    Annual Meeting on Mathematical Economics and Related Fields  2019.11 

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    Language:Japanese   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

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  • Core convergence theorems for economies with bads International conference

    28th European Workshop on Economic Theory  2019.6 

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    Language:English   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

    We prove the convergence of core allocations for a sequence of economies with bads. We assume that consumers' preference relations are similar in three aspects. First, consumers' preference relations are equi-convex. Second, every upper contour set of every consumer has the same asymptotic cone. Third, the rate of convergence to the common asymptotic cone is uniform among consumers. Under these assumptions, we prove that, for every sequence of core allocations, a measure of noncompetitiveness converges to zero and consumers' consumption vectors at core allocations converge in measure to their demand vectors. We exemplify that the third assumption cannot be dispensed with in our core convergence theorems.

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  • Core convergence theorems for economies with bads International conference

    10th Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications  2018.10 

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    Language:English   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

    We give a sufficient condition for the core convergence in economies with bads. We assume that consumers' preference relations are similar mainly in two aspects. First, consumers' preference relations are equi-convex. Second, the rate of convergence of the upper contour sets at endowment vector to its asymptotic cones is similar among consumers. The second point played a key role even in proving the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium for an economy with a continuum of consumers and with bads.

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  • Core convergence theorems for economies with bads

    24th Decentralization Conference  2018.9 

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    Language:English   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

    Venue:Waseda University  

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  • Perfect competition in economies with bads

    2016 Japanese Economic Association Autumn Meeting  2016.9 

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    Language:Japanese   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

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  • Perfect competition in economies with bads International conference

    2016 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society  2016.8 

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    Language:English   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

    Venue:Doshisha University  

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  • Upper hemi-continuity of the Walras correspondence for economies with bads

    22nd Decentralization Conference  2016.8 

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    Language:Japanese   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

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  • Perfect competition in economies with bads International conference

    XXV European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory  2016.6 

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    Language:English   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

    Venue:University of Glasgow Adam Smith Business School  

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  • Perfect competition in economies with bads

    21st Decentralization Conference  2015.10 

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    Language:Japanese   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

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  • Existence of an equilibrium for an atomless economy with bads International conference

    XXIV European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory  2015.6 

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    Language:English   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

    Venue:University of Naples Federico II  

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  • Existence of equilibrium in economies with indivisible commodities and savings International conference

    XXII European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory  2013.5 

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    Language:English   Presentation type:Oral presentation (general)  

    Venue:University of Vienna & Institute of Advanced Studies  

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Research Projects

  • Perfect Competition in Economies with Bads

    Grant number:16K03560  2016.4 - 2019.3

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    Authorship:Principal investigator 

    Grant amount:\2080000 ( Direct Cost: \1690000 、 Indirect Cost:\390000 )

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  • 全ての財が非分割である経済の均衡分析

    Grant number:06J02527  2006 - 2007

    日本学術振興会  科学研究費助成事業  特別研究員奨励費

    井上 朋紀

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    Grant amount:\2300000 ( Direct Cost: \2300000 )

    (1)有限人の経済主体がそれぞれ非分割財(例えば家)を一つずつ持っており、それを交換するShapley-Scarf経済において、強コア(strict core)と費用最小化を満たす競争配分(cost-minimized competitive allocation)の集合が一致することを示した。(これは既に知られた結果であるが、より簡単な証明を与えた。)この結果を利用して、Shapley-Scarf経済が与えられた時に、強コアが非空の場合には強コア配分をリポートし、強コアが空集合である場合には、強コアが空集合であることをリポートするアルゴリズムを提示した。そのアルゴリズムでは、まず費用最小化を満たす競争均衡価格の候補を構成する。強コアが非空である場合には、全ての強コア配分がその価格の下で競争配分となり、強コアが空集合である場合には、その価格の下で競争配分は存在しないことが示せるので、このアルゴリズムを利用することによって、原理的には全ての強コア配分を求めることができる。(2)全ての財が整数単位でのみ消費可能である交換経済における強コアと競争配分の関係を分析した。昨年度までに、経済主体の数が十分に大きければ、強コアは競争配分の集合に含まれることを示していた(論文 Indivisible Cmmodities and Decentralization of Strong Core Allocations)。この成果を二つの学会で報告した。(3)昨年度採択された論文Indivisible commodities and the nonemptiness of the weak coreがJournal of Mathematical Economicsに掲載された。

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